Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo said today that the Armed Forces are closely monitoring the routine activities of PRC vessels in Taiwan’s surrounding waters, as well as China’s continued expansion of its military threats and gray-zone coercion. Through measured, orderly, and controlled responses, the Armed Forces are coordinating with the Coast Guard Administration to address these activities appropriately and safeguard national security and regional stability.
Minister Koo appeared before the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee this morning to deliver a special report entitled “Response Measures for Routine Activities by Chinese Vessels in Taiwan’s Waters” and answer legislators’ questions. Lieutenant General Hou Chia-lun, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Planning at the Ministry of National Defense, briefed the committee on the relevant response measures.
Lieutenant General Hou said that China has increasingly normalized its incursions into waters surrounding Taiwan in recent years. Since August 2022, the PLA has regularly conducted combat readiness activities in waters around Taiwan. During targeted military exercises against Taiwan in late December 2025, PLA forces entered Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone and approached its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. PRC maritime law enforcement vessels have also conducted what Beijing describes as law enforcement patrols in the Taiwan Strait under the guise of “special maritime traffic law enforcement operations” and “maritime search and rescue exercises.” In June this year, China dispatched a formation to waters east of Taiwan, unilaterally expanding and abusing its claims of maritime jurisdiction to create the false impression that it exercises long-arm jurisdiction over the area.
Lieutenant General Hou added that since February 2024, PRC Coast Guard vessels have entered and harassed Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen and Matsu under the pretext of rights-protection patrols, subsequently expanding their patrol areas. Chinese research and oceanographic survey vessels, meanwhile, have used marine scientific research as a pretext to conduct long-term hydrographic data collection and battlefield preparation missions in waters surrounding Taiwan and beyond the First Island Chain. China’s approach has evolved from overt military intimidation into a pattern of “law enforcement as a pretext, military-coast guard coordination, and incremental encroachment at sea,” intended to mislead the international community.
In response to the routine activities of PRC vessels, the Armed Forces will employ joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems integrating naval and air assets, shore-based radar, electronic reconnaissance, satellite intelligence, and unmanned systems. Under the established coordination mechanism between the Armed Forces and the Coast Guard, intelligence sharing, joint monitoring, real-time reporting, and coordinated command will enable the early detection of threats, timely assessments, and rapid responses.
Lieutenant General Hou further explained that when maritime law enforcement is involved, the Coast Guard Administration will conduct inspections, monitoring, and ordering vessels to leave the area in accordance with the law. The Armed Forces will maintain naval and air readiness, closely track PRC vessel movements, and deploy appropriate forces based on the developing situation and level of threat. Should PRC government vessels conduct joint operations with naval and air forces, the Armed Forces will act under joint operations plans and the joint command mechanism to deploy forces rapidly, raise combat readiness levels, and strengthen command and control.
During the session, a legislator asked whether the Ministry of National Defense and the Coast Guard had coordinated command-and-control measures in place for a worst-case scenario involving escalating confrontation with PRC Coast Guard vessels or warships. Minister Koo responded that when the PRC Coast Guard issues radio broadcasts, Taiwan must respond with maritime radio responses to assert its sovereignty. Nevertheless, the overarching principle remains to avoid escalating the confrontation.
While seeking to prevent escalation, the Armed Forces will respond in accordance with established contingency measures and retain the capability to exercise self-defense, including taking necessary defensive actions, recognized under international law. Minister Koo added that these principles had been explained on numerous occasions.
Legislators also asked whether relying on annual budgets instead of enacting the Special Act for the Procurement of Domestically Developed Unmanned Vehicles for National Defense would affect the procurement, production, and delivery schedules of unmanned systems. Minister Koo replied that annual budgets are inherently uncertain. It is therefore necessary to consider whether manufacturers could still support the goal of defense self-reliance and build complete industrial and supply chains under such uncertain conditions. Without appropriate policy support, current production capacity would be insufficient to meet defense requirements, making measures to strengthen the industry all the more necessary.
Addressing concerns that special budgets might constitute a “blank check,” Minister Koo stressed that this was not the case. Both the special act and its associated special budgets must be submitted for review on a case-by-case basis. Each individual program may proceed only after being deliberated and approved by the Legislative Yuan. The process therefore remains subject to legislative oversight.